Moral assessment moral hazard in indirect reciprocity by Sigmund, K.






Sigmund, K. (2012) Moral assessment moral hazard in indirect reciprocity. IIASA Interim Report . IIASA, Laxenburg, 
Austria, IR-12-070 Copyright © 2012 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10209/
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
 International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 342




Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
Interim Report IR-12-070
Moral assessment and moral hazard in indirect reciprocity 











Moral assessment and moral hazard in
indirect reciprocity
Karl Sigmund 1,2
1 Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
2 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
February 16, 2011
Keywords: evolutionary game theory; indirect reciprocity; cooperation; reputa-
tion;
Corresponding author: Karl Sigmund
Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria





In The Descent of Man (Darwin 1872), Darwin wrote that in contrast to other
social animals such as bees or ants, mans ’motive to give aid no longer consists
solely of a blind instinctive impulse, but is largely influenced by the praise and
blame of his fellow men’ (our italics). Why should we attach weight to purely
symbolic incentives such as praise and blame? Probably because they are often
associated with more material incentives. It would make little sense to strive for
a good image if all were treated equally. What others know about us is likely to
affect the way we are treated.
In many modern approaches to the evolution of human cooperation, the quest
to obtain a good image in the eyes of others is relatively neglected. Both in the-
oretical investigations and experimental tests, it is often assumed that players are
anonymous. In real-life interactions, anonymity is less frequent. Usually, we have
some information about the individuals we interact with, and are concerned about
our own image.
In this paper, the role of reputation in indirect reciprocity will be reviewed.
Indirect reciprocity is one of the Five mechanisms of cooperation (Nowak 2006),
and arguably the one that is most special to humans. But it should be stressed
right away that (a) reputation plays an important role in other forms of cooperation
too (not just in indirect reciprocity), and that (b) conversely, there exist forms of
indirect reciprocity which are not based on reputation assessment. This will be
taken up in more detail in the discussion.
The canonical approach towards explaining altruistic acts (which, by defini-
tion, imply a cost to agents who confer benefits to others) is based on a long
philosophical tradition. It aims to show that the costs can be recouped in the long
run, so that they are self-interested after all. In other words, it means to take the
altruism out of altruism (Trivers 2002).
The simplest scenario in this context is that of reciprocal altruism, usually
modeled as a repeated Prisoners Dilemma game (Trivers 1971). The recipient of
a helpful action returns help at some later occasion. This is the basis of direct
reciprocation. ’You scratch my back, and Ill scratch yours’. With indirect reci-
procity, the helpful action is returned, not by the recipient, but by a third party.
’You scratch my back, and someone will scratch yours.’ This promise seems even
more suspect than the previous one. Why should anyone shoulder my debt, and
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pay vicariously, in my stead?
Among the several variants of indirect reciprocity, the best known is based on
reputation (Sugden 1986, Alexander 1987, Nowak and Sigmund 2005). Help is
channeled toward those who have acquired the reputation to be helpful. In this
way, exploiters are repressed.
2 Reputation assessment
The simplest model is based on a large, well-mixed population of players ran-
domly meeting each other (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b). The probability that
the same two players meet more than once is negligible, in such a scenario. When-
ever two players meet, chance decides who is the (potential) Donor and who is
Recipient. Donors decide whether or not to confer a benefit b to the Recipient,
at a cost c to themselves. As usual, it is assumed that c < b. Donors providing
help acquire the image G (for good), and Donors refusing help the image B (for
Bad). Thus players have binary images, entirely determined by what they decided
when last in the position of Donor. We can then consider three strategies: (1)
the unconditional helpers AllC who always provide help, (2) the unconditional
defectors AllD who always refuse to help, and (3) the conditional co-operators
CondC, who help Recipients if and only if these have a G-image. This strategy is
the obvious analogue of TFT (Tit For Tat). It refuses help to those players who,
in their previous round, refused to help. We denote by x, y and z the frequencies
of the three strategies (x+ y + z = 1).
If a population contains only two of these strategies, the outcome is the same
with direct as with indirect reciprocity (Brandt and Sigmund 2006). AllD players
dominate AllC players. The competition of AllD with the conditional strategy
is bi-stable, as long as the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b is smaller than the probabil-
ity w for another round (with the same partner, in direct reciprocity, and with
some other partner, in indirect reciprocity). In a mixture of unconditional and
conditional co-operators, both do equally well. In order to avoid this dynamic de-
generacy, and also to add a realistic feature, we assume that with a probability ǫ,
an intended help is not implemented (see also Fishman 2003, Fishman et al 2001,
Lotem et al 1999). In this case, there exists a stable coexistence betweenAllC and
CondC. In the interior of the simplex ∆3 which corresponds to the state space
of the population (x, y, z), the replicator dynamics (see (Hofbauer and Sigmund
1998) admits a line of rest points, which joins the AllD + CondC equilibrium
with the AllC + CondC equilibrium and is given by a constant value of z. In the
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vicinity of the AllC + CondC equilibrium, these rest points are stable (but not
asymptotically stable, of course). These stable rest points correspond to highly
cooperative populations. In the long run, however, random shocks will eventually
push the population into the homogeneous state y = 1 corresponding to the fixa-
tion of AllD (Fig 1). Hence cooperation can prevail for some time, in this model,
but will ultimately break down. Although the details of the dynamics differ, the
same conclusion holds with direct reciprocity too, if CondC is replaced by TFT .
(We assume, in both cases, that the cost c is smaller than the discounted benefit
that can be expected in the following round, i.e., wb(1− ǫ). If this does not hold,
the triumph of AllD is immediate.)
One of the reasons for the failure of CondC lies in its paradoxical nature.
If a conditional co-operator refuses help to a player with image B, it acquires
that image too. The CondC-player can, by helping a G-recipient on the next
opportunity, redress that image. But during some time, the player is branded, and
less likely to receive help. In this sense, the act of punishing a B-player is costly.
The strategy can help to uphold cooperation in the population (for a while), but
this comes at a price.
There is an obvious way to repair this weakness. It consists in discriminat-
ing between justified and unjustified defection. The same problem had already
been treated in the context of direct reciprocation. It is well known that a pure
TFT -population is greatly plagued by errors in implementation. Each such er-
ror provokes a chain of backbiting. A variant of TFT called ContriteTFT can
overcome this problem. It is based on the notion of standing (Sugden 1986). In
a similar vein, Sugden suggested that assessments, in indirect reciprocity, should
take into account whether the Recipient of a refusal to help had a B- or a G-image.
Only the latter refusal should be considered as bad, and entail a B image to the
non-helping Donor. ’A player can keep his good standing even as he defects, as
long as the defection is directed at a player with bad standing. We believe that
Sugdens strategy is a good approximation to how indirect reciprocation actually
works.’(Nowak and Sigmund 1998a) This point was taken up by a number of au-
thors (Panchanathan and Boyd 2003, Leimar and Hammerstein 2001).
This opens up a vast range of ways of assessing actions, (i.e., attributing a
G- or a B-image), even if the actions are not directed at the observer. A first-
order assessment rule simply depends on whether the Donor helps the Recipient
or not. A second-order assessment rule takes into account, additionally, whether
the Recipient has a G-image or a B-image. A third order assessment rule can
depend, additionally, on the image of the Donor. It may make a difference whether
a B-player or a G-player provides help to a B-player. Altogether, there are 256
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third-order assessment rules.
A strategy, in this indirect reciprocity game, depends not only on the assess-
ment rule (i.e., how the player judges actions between two other players), but also
how such an assessment is used to reach a decision on whether to help or not. A
player could, for instance, decide to give help only to G-players. But the player
could also take into account the own image, and help, for instance, whenever the
own image is B, so as to remove the blemish as quickly as possible. There are
16 such action rules (including the two unconditional rules AllC and AllD), and
hence 4096 different strategies conceivable in this set-up (Brandt and Sigmund
2004, Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2004). Not surprisingly, most are nonsensical.
Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004, 2006) have shown that there exist, among the 256
assessment rules, only eight which can lead to cooperation, when the whole pop-
ulation embraces them. Each of these ’leading eight’ is stable in the following
sense: there exists a specific action rule such that no dissident minority using an-
other action rule (such as AllC or AllD) can do better, and invade. None of these
’leading eight’ is of first order. Each distinguishes between justified and unjusti-
fied defection. They agree on several points. It is always good to give help to a
G-player, and always bad to withhold help from a G-player. Moreover, a good
player refusing help to a B-player does not loose the G-image. There remain
three situations: namely when someone (good or bad) helps a B-player, or when
a B-player refuses help to a B-player. This yields the 23 = 8 assessment systems
belonging to the leading eight. Two of them are of second order, and in the fol-
lowing we shall only deal with them. They both agree in viewing (rather oddly)
that a B-player refusing to help a B-player obtains a G-image. They disagree on
whether it is good to help a B-player or not. The assessment that views it as good
will be termed MILD, the other STERN . For both MILD and STERN , the
corresponding action rule is: give help if and only if the Recipient has image G.
(In particular, the own image will not influence the decision). The corresponding
strategy will again be denote by MILD resp. STERN .
It is straightforward to analyze the replicator dynamics for a population con-
sisting of the two unconditional strategies AllC and AllD and either the MILD
or the STERN strategy (Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2007, Sigmund 2010). In each case,
we obtain a bi-stable situation. (Fig.2) But what happens if both the MILD and
the STERN strategy occur in the population? This is not obvious. It is impor-
tant to note that the stability of the leading eight means: no other action rule can
invade. This does not imply that no other assessment rule can invade.
Ohtsuki and Iwasa have assumed, like several other authors (Panchanathan
and Boyd 2004, etcXXX), that all members of the population agree in their as-
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sessment. This means that every player has either the G- or the B-image in the
eyes of all players. These authors would agree that it is unlikely that all players
observe all interactions, but they assume that every interaction is observed by one
player, whose assessment is then shared by all. No matter whether this is a likely
scenario or not, it has clearly to be abandoned as soon as one is interested in the
competition of several assessment rules. Which moral norm is likely to become
established in the population?
Thus G and B mean different things in the eyes of a MILD or a STERN
observer. To distinguish them, we may say that a player can be good or bad when
assessed according to the MILD rules, and nice or nasty when assessed by the
STERN rules. A priori, then, a player can be good and nice, good and nasty, bad
and nice or bad and nasty.
The replicator dynamics of a population consisting only of players adopting
the MILD or the STERN strategy is disappointing. There is no selective ad-
vantage one way or the other, the segment representing all possible mixtures of
MILD and STERN consists of rest points. If we add unconditional AllC- or
AllD-players to the population, we observe a bistable outcome. Depending on the
initial condition, either a homogeneous AllD population will emerge, or a stable
mixture of MILD and STERN . The best that can be said is that STERN has
a slight advantage, in the sense that whenever there are equally many STERN
and MILD players (together with unconditional players), the ratio of STERN
to MILD will increase (Uchida and Sigmund, 2010).
This analysis, so far, has relied on the assumption of perfect information. Ev-
ery players knows about every interaction, either by direct observation or through
gossip. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption. If we want to give it up, we must
assume that every player has a private list of the images of all other players. Thus
the image matrix (βij) consists of entries G or B, depending on whether player j
has image G or B in the eyes of player i. Whenever player j is Donor to some
Recipient player k, then those players i who observe the interaction will have an
occasion for updating their image of j. The new entries will depend on βik (since
we assume only second-order assessments, the image of the Donor plays no role).
But if player i does not observe the interaction between j and k, the value βij
remains unchanged.
This updating process corresponds to a Markov chain on the space of image
matrices. A rigorous analysis seems to offer considerable challenges. Uchida has
investigated the stochastic process by means of extensive computer simulations
(Uchida 2011). The outcome is striking. The smallest deviation from the perfect-
information condition has disastrous consequences for a homogeneous population
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of STERN players. In the long run, every entry of the image matrix is G or B
with equal probability. The entries are uncorrelated. Thus effectively, a STERN
player is not doing any better than a player letting a coin-toss decide between
helping or not. Compared with this, a homogeneous population of MILD players
does much better. A large majority of them will keep agreeing on the images
of their co-players. (The percentage depends only on the probability ǫ of mis-
implementing an intended donation, and on the probability q to observe a given
interaction.) A CondC population, on the other hand, ends up with a bad image
for everyone. But a mixture of CondC and AllD can keep cooperating: meeting
with an AllC-player provides the conditional co-operators with an opportunity to
redress their image.
In order to obtain an intuitive feeling for these results, we may look at the
updating process for βij . With probability (1 − q), it remains unchanged. With
probability q, it will be replaced by the new image of j in the eyes of player i. This
is 1 if either (a) j gives to k, and i approves, or j refuses to help k, and i approves.
The probability that j helps k is (1−ǫ)βjk, and the probability that i approves is 1 if
i follows the MILD or CondC assessment rule, and βik in the case of STERN .
The probability that j refuses to help k is 1− (1− ǫ)βjk, and the probability that i
approves is (1− βik if i follows the MILD or STERN assessment rule, and 0 if
i plays CondC. If we assume (wrongly) that the images of k in the eyes of i and
j, i.e., βik and βjk, are independent, and if we denote by hij the expected value of
βij etc, then in the stationary equilibrium, where hij = hjk = h by symmetry, we
obtain for CondC, MILD and STERN , respectively
(1− ǫ)h = h
(1− ǫ)h + (1− (1− ǫ)h)(1− h) = h
(1− ǫ)h2 + (1− (1− ǫ)h)(1− h) = h
. The corresponding solutions are h = 0, h = (1 +
√
ǫ)−1 and h = 1/2, respec-
tively. Of course the independence assumption is false, but in the case of small q
it is almost satisfied.
This handful of results is a striking illustration of the fact that information
conditions are of the utmost importance, for reputation-based indirect reciprocity.
This was stressed already in the first papers on this topic. In (Nowak and Sigmund
1998b), q denotes the probability that a player knows about the reputation of an-
other player, i.e., has some information about the behavior of that player. With
probability 1− q, the co-player is unknown. In this case, it is assumed that the co-
player receives the benefit of doubt, i.e., is held to be a G-player. CondC-players
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could resist invasion by AllD players if q > c/b (or, in a more elaborate model, if
c < qwb(1− ǫ). In (Uchida 2011) q is the probability that a given player observes
the last action of a co-player. If not, then the co-players former image will remain
unaltered. Eventually, models will have to encompass both types of uncertainty.
It could be that in Alices eyes, player Bob is a stranger. It could also be that Alice
knows Bob, but has missed Bobs last action as a Donor.
Whatever the interpretation of q, it seems likely that it is not a constant. In
particular, it is reasonable to assume that the social network of a player grows
with time. In this case, the player will be more and more likely to know the
reputation of a recipient. In (Fishman et al 2001), (Mohtashemi and Lui 2003)
and (Brandt and Sigmund 2005), it is shown that appropriate assumptions can
turn the CondC + AllC equilibrium into a stable attractor, able to repel invasion
attempts by AllD-minorities.
It is an obvious weakness of all models considered so far that they are based
on a very short memory only. Assessments are updated according to the action
last observed. In real life, reputations are not always based on one action only. If
we know that a player has cooperated for a long time, and we suddenly see him
defecting in one interaction, we will not necessarily lose our good opinion of him
(but rather assume that the recipient deserved no better). In particular, (Berger
2011) has shown that a tolerant first-order assessment rule (TolerantScoring)
can stably sustain cooperation. Such an assessment with built-in tolerance against
single defections can be based on sampling two actions in the recipients past.
Several models consider a more sophisticated evaluation system, for instance
with a score that is not binary (see e.g. Nowak and Sigmund 1998a, or Leimar
and Hammerstein 2001). It provides stability to cooperation: a few isolated de-
fections will not destroy the good reputation that a player has accumulated, but
only slightly reduce it.
3 Discussion
Historically, studies of indirect reciprocity were based on direct reciprocity. In
a certain sense, however, indirect reciprocity can be viewed as the primary phe-
nomenon, and direct reciprocity as a special case, based on direct experience (as
a recipient) of the co-players action. In any case, direct and indirect reciproca-
tion are likely to interact. Thus, players who start a repeated Prisoners Dilemma
interaction with some co-player are likely to be guided by that co-players past be-
havior towards others, and to defect in the first move. The corresponding strategy
8
ObserverTFT (Pollock and Dugatkin 1992) is an interesting link between TFT
and CondC. (Whereas the usual TFT -player, on engaging with a new partner
in a repeated Prisoners Dilemma game, always provides help, an ObserverTFT
also takes into account how that new partner behaved in interactions with others,
and in particular defects in the first round if and only if this new partner was last
seen defecting.)
Roberts (Roberts 2005) has pointed out that in small populations, the assump-
tion that players interact at most once is implausible. If the probability of re-
meeting is sufficiently large, CondC will be superseded by strategies based on
direct experience. But a second-order assessment based on three images (good,
bad and neutral) exploits advantageously the supplementary information conveyed
by reputation and proves superior to strategies based on direct experience only.
It seems plausible that humans do not have separate modules for playing di-
rect reciprocity or indirect reciprocity. Similarly, behavior in direct or indirect
reciprocity affects, and is affected, by behavior in public good games (Milinski et
al 2002a,b, Panchanathan and Boyd 2004 xxx). A good reputation for cooperating
in dyadic interactions is likely to promote the reputation for cooperating in larger
groups, and vice versa. (In this context, it may be noted that non-punishers will,
in general, not be punished, see Kiyonari et al 2004, just as rewarders will often
be rewarded in turn. The former issue is an Achilles heel for cooperation based on
negative incentives. The latter is an advantage for cooperation based on positive
incentives.)
Both direct and indirect reciprocity rely on the implicit assumption that players
act consistently, and that past behavior allows to infer future actions.
An impressive number of experiments have shown that indirect reciprocity
works (Wedekind and Milinski 2000, Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002, Bolton
et al 2004, 2005, Seinen and Schram 2005, Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009).
Interestingly, many players seem to content themselves with first-order assess-
ment, possibly because higher-oder assessment is cognitively taxing (Milinski et
al 2001). Of particular interest are the large-scale experiments unwittingly pro-
vided by e-trading (Keser 2002, Bolton et al 2004). In e-Bay, for instance, the
remarkably high level of honesty is supported by a very simple assessment system
based on the satisfaction of customers with their partners. This measure (amalga-
mated over six months) does not take into account the reputation of the customers
themselves who evaluate their partner, and hence is of first-order.
Ever since Trivers seminal paper on reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971), it is
known that reciprocation need not be based on repeated interactions between the
same two players only. There exist different notions of generalized reciprocation.
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What we have described is reciprocation based on reputation: players known for
being helpful are more likely to be helped not necessarily by their recipients,
but possibly by others who return the help vicariously, so to speak. Vicarious
reciprocation is also known as up-stream reciprocity. We may say that help is
caused by a feeling of admiration (Shalizi 2011). Down-stream reciprocity occurs
when a player who has been helped returns the help, not to the donor, but to a
third party. This can be viewed as misguided reciprocation, caused by a feeling
of gratitude. Such misguided reciprocation is well documented by experiments,
not only on humans (Wedekind and Milinski 2000, Engelmann and Fischbacher
2009, Rutte and Taborsky 2007, Rutte and Pfeiffer 2009, Barta et al 2010). So
far, the only theoretical models that support it seem to require some structured
population, and localized interactions (Pfeiffer et al 2005).
The promise of a reward (i.e., a positive incentive) can be used to promote
cooperation, if individuals are opportunistically motivated to help whenever they
can expect a reward (Hauert et al 2001). The mechanisms are not quite the same.
In indirect reciprocity, players reward a co-player because they know that this
co-player has performed a helpful action. In the context of positive incentives,
players perform a helpful action because they know that they will receive a re-
ward. Switching from positive to negative incentives, we note that an individual
with a reputation for punishing cheaters is more likely not to be exploited. In
several papers, it has been argued that a player with a reputation as a punisher
is less likely to encounter exploiters. Hence, acquiring such a reputation can be
beneficial (Hauert, Sigmund,etc XXX). (So far, there seems only one experimen-
tal paper supporting this view, see Barclay 2011). All these mechanisms (indirect
reciprocity, positive and negative incentives) can be viewed as instances of gener-
alized reciprocity, and the corresponding strategies as offspring of Tit For Tat.
In a larger context, explanations of cooperation based on the handicap princi-
ple, such as competitive altruism, also rely on reputation (Zahavi 1995, Roberts
1998, Bshary and Grutter 2006, Sylwester and Roberts 2010). An individual who
is known as a good co-operator is more likely to be chosen as partner than an indi-
vidual known for free-riding. The resulting partner-market may well be the most
important aspect of reputation-based cooperation. Our reputation can greatly af-
fect our economic opportunities. As Darwin said, praise and blame can have an
important influence on our willingness to help others.
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